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BIG DATA, BOTH FRIEND AND FOE: THE INTERSECTION OF
PRIVACY AND TRADE ON THE TRANSATLANTIC STAGE
Gabrielle C. Craft*
ABSTRACT
This Note analyzes the data privacy protection initiatives
implemented by the European Union and the United States and their
effects on international trade. As technology develops, the feasibility
of data collection increases, allowing for the collecting of inconceivable
amounts of data information. Consequently, this data includes
personal information, thus implicating privacy concerns and the need
for data privacy protection regulations. Data privacy focuses on the
use and governance of personal data and how the data is gathered,
collected, and stored. In 2018, the European Union enacted the General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which sets out highly stringent
standards for how organizations conducting business with European
Union citizens may handle their data. While the United States lacks an
all-encompassing data-protection law similar to the GDPR, the
likelihood of federal implementation of such regulation is growing.
Due to the tech industry’s exponential growth, data privacy
regulations have had trouble keeping pace. Nevertheless, data privacy
protection is more necessary than ever. The discrepancies in data
privacy regulations gravely affect international business relationships
governed by the different regulations. This Note discusses the affects,
benefits, and possible solutions to these issues.
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INTRODUCTION TO DATA PRIVACY

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights lists privacy as a
fundamental human right to be achieved by all people and all nations.1
The right to privacy is a right many nations hold to the utmost
importance. However, the cherished right to privacy is under siege as
the rise of big data and technological growth. To fully appreciate its
significance, this topic requires an understanding of the historical
development of big data and its potential benefits and costs.
Merriam-Webster dictionary defines “data” as “factual
information (such as measurements or statistics) used as a basis for
reasoning, discussion, or calculation.”2 In this context, data has been
around since at least the creation of the cuneiform script in
Mesopotamia circa 3200 BC.3 Over time, humans’ ability to develop
data grew, from phonetic signs to the alphabet to the printing press.
Now, technology has allowed for instant record keeping. No longer
are most records kept in hard-copy format; most records are now
1

G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf.
2
Data, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/data (last
visited Jan. 14, 2021).
3
Denise Schmandt-Besserat, Evolution of Writing, INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 761 (James D. Wright ed., 2d ed. 2015).
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created, disseminated, and stored digitally, making data collection
more effortless than ever.
Enabled by technology, the growth of data collection
multiplied extraordinarily. To illustrate this growth, in 2010, data
scientists estimated that the digital universe consisted of 2 exabytes4
(EB).5 In 2020, data scientists estimate that the digital universe
consisted of 64,200 EB of data.6 Further, by 2025, experts estimate the
digital universe will consist of 181,000 EB.7 About 463 EB of data will
be generated each day as of 2025.8 As such, more data will be produced
in five days than the entire amount of data that existed in 2010.9 For a
physical representation, the United States’ Library of Congress
contains 15 terabytes (TB).10 One EB is the equivalent of one million
TB.11 By 2025, 463 EB of data, equivalent to about thirty-one billion
Libraries of Congress, will be created every twenty-four hours. From
this rapid growth emerged the term “big data.”
Although big data poses serious privacy concerns12, it also has
significant benefits for society’s social and economic development.
Academic and business communities benefit from the usage of big
data, which yields innovative insights, products, and services.13 Big

4

One gigabyte is around 64,782 pages of a Word document. After the GB comes the
terabyte, petabyte, exabyte, zettabyte, and yottabyte. For example, 463 EB, the
projected daily growth of the digital universe by 2025, converted into gigabytes (GB)
would equal 463,000,000,000 GB, an unfathomable amount of data. See How Many
Pages in a Gigabyte?, LEXISNEXIS, https://www.lexisnexis.com/applieddiscovery/
lawlibrary/whitepapers/adi_fs_pagesinagigabyte.pdf.
5
Arne Holst, Amount of data created, consumed, and stored 2010–2025, STATISTA
(June 7, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/871513/worldwide-data.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Jacquelyn Bulao, How Much Data Is Created Every Day in 2021?, TECHJURY (Jan.
4, 2022), https://techjury.net/blog/how-much-data-is-created-every-day/#gref.
9
Holst, supra note 5.
10
Catherine Armitage, Optimism shines through experts’ view of the future, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD (Mar. 24, 2012, 3:00 AM), https://www.smh.com.au/national/opti
mism-shines-through-experts-view-of-the-future-20120323-1vpas.html.
11
Patrick Thomas, Defining an Exabyte, BACK BLAZE (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.
backblaze.com/blog/what-is-an-exabyte/.
12
See discussion infra at 5–8.
13
Wendy Arianne Günther et al., Debating big data: A literature review on realizing
value from big data, 26 THE J. OF STRATEGIC INFO. SYS. 191, 191 (2017).
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data has been instrumental in social improvements in education,
healthcare, and public safety and security. Furthermore, the economic
value of data includes employment and business growth,
productivity, and consumer surplus.14
Based on an analysis of education literature, if schools use data
sources in the same way that businesses do, public schools would have
a greater understanding of their students as individuals and how best
to help them succeed.15 Data would give school districts the ability to
analyze the strengths and weaknesses of each school and teacher and
give them the ability to make informed decisions based on “evidence
provided through the analysis of all available digitized sources.”16
Data analysis can provide schools with the opportunity to customize
education and meet the needs of every student.17 For example, studies
have shown that big data can find “repetitive patterns of failure or
success” which allows teachers to “solve the former and promote the
latter.”18 Additionally, by analyzing “what [the students] ask, what
they look for, what doubts they have, the deadlines they meet or do
not meet, their normal delivery format, the way they present the
information, and their learning style” data can tailor a personalized
education plan to ensure academic success.19
Similarly, in the healthcare industry, data “hold[s] the promise
of supporting a wide range of medical and healthcare functions,
including among others clinical decision support, disease surveillance,
and population health management.”20 For example, big data has
helped to minimize the spread and aided in understanding and
creation of the COVID-19 vaccine.21 The public safety and security
14

Id. at 191–92.
Thomas G. Cech, et al., Applying Business Analytic Methods To Improve
Organizational Performance In The Public School System, AMERICAS CONF. ON INFO.
SYS. 2015 PROC. 1, 9 (June 26, 2015).
16
Id. at 9.
17
Id. at 10.
18
Julio Ruiz-Palmero et al., Big Data in Education: Perception of Training Advisors
on Its Use in the Educational System, 9 SOC. SCI. 53, 53–54 (Apr. 15, 2020).
19
Id. at 55.
20
Wullianallur Raghupathi & Viju Raghupathi, Big data analytics in healthcare:
promise and potential, 2 HEALTH INFO. SCI. AND SYS., no. 3, Feb. 7, 2014, at 1, 1.
21
Abid Haleem et al., Significant Applications of Big Data in COVID-19 Pandemic,
54 INDIAN J. OF ORTHOPEDICS 526, 526 (2020).
15
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industry also benefits from big data. “Governments, for instance, can
use big data to, ‘enhance transparency, increase citizen engagement in
public affairs, prevent fraud and crime, improve national security, and
support the wellbeing of people through better education and
healthcare.’”22 These types of benefits not only directly affect the
individual but society as a whole through “employment growth,
productivity, and consumer surplus.”23
Beyond consumer value, big data also has business and
economic value “that can be measured through an organization’s
increase in profit, business growth, and competitive advantage
resulting from big data adoption.”24 Big data increases efficiency in
business by “optimizing supply chain flows; setting the most
profitable price for products and services; selecting the right people for
certain tasks and jobs; minimizing errors and quality problems; and
improving customer relationships.”25 However, these substantial
benefits come at the cost of privacy issues. Who sees all this data
collected? What do they do with it? Do they share this data with
others? Are they keeping this information secure from potential
criminals?
One of the biggest concerns with the collection of data is the
threat of identity theft. Identity theft has topped FTC’s Annual
Consumer Complaints for 15 years up until 2015.26 Only recently
replaced by imposter scams and debt collection, identity theft is still
one of the most common issues faced by consumers today.27 In 2020
alone, the FTC reported $3.3 billion in total fraud losses—an increase
of nearly $1.5 billion over 2019. 28 “Identity theft occurs when someone
22

Günther, supra note 13, at 191 (quoting Kim Gang-Hoon, et al., Big-data
applications in the government sector, 57 COMMC’NS OF THE ACM 78, 81 (2014)).
23
Id. (quoting Claudia Loebbecke & Arnold Picot, Reflections on societal and
business model transformation arising from digitization and big data analytics: A
research agenda, 24 J. OF STRATEGIC INFO. SYS. 149 (2015)).
24
Id. at 192.
25
Id.
26
FTC Release Annual Summary of Consumer Complaints, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/
03/ftc-releases-annual-summary-consumer-complaints.
27
Id.
28
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK DATA BOOK 2020
(January 2020).
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poses as another person by using that person’s personal information
without his or her permission.”29 Companies that store large amounts
of data become targets for hackers seeking to steal personal and
financial information. Criminals use stolen identities for a range of
reasons. From using credit card information to influencing elections,
identity theft is a severe problem in big data. For example, Russian
operatives influenced the 2016 presidential election through stolen
identities that allowed them access to United States based servers and
open United States bank accounts and PayPal accounts to purchased
Facebook ads and “buttons flags, and banners” for political rallies.30
These operatives also used these stolen identities to pose as Americans
on United States social media accounts.31
Who are these third-party companies that store data, and what
do they do with all this information? As data grew, so did many
organizations’ need for a third-party to manage data. Enter: data
brokers. Data brokers collect, store, package, and sell data to other
businesses for profit.32 The largest companies in this industry gross
annual revenues in the billions.33 Data brokers collect information and
sell it to other companies that find this information helpful to their
business.34 Just one example of a data broker transaction is when a
political party buys information that is statistically indicative of an
individual’s political affiliation in the hopes of targeting potential
supportive voters. A major concern raised by data brokers’ existence
is that the majority of consumers have no idea that these covert
companies are collecting their information.
”In the world of data brokers, you have no idea who
all has bought, acquired or harvested information
about you, what they do with it, who they provide it
to, whether it is right or wrong or how much money is
29

JOHN T. SOMA, PRIVACY IN A NUTSHELL 338 (2nd ed. 2014).
SUSAN ARIEL AARONSON, DATA IS DANGEROUS: COMPARING THE RISKS THAT THE
UNITED STATES, CANADA AND GERMANY SEE IN DATA TROVES 6 (Ctr. for Int’l
Governance Innovation (2020).
31
Id.
32
SOMA, supra note 29, at 369.
33
Id.
34
Id.
30
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being made on your digital identity. Nor do you have
the right to demand that they delete their profile on
you.”35
Data brokers create privacy concerns because they are an easy
target for criminals to acquire massive amounts of information by
hacking into one data broker database. Additional privacy concerns
include how these companies are collecting, using, and selling
personal information.
Another prominent concern is how much control governments
can assert using the information they collect from big data. When it
comes to governments’ use of data collection, governments’ amount
and access were unclear until the Snowden revelations. In 2014,
Edward Snowden, a former NSA employee, blew the whistle on the
United States’ controversial data collection activity.36 These
disclosures exposed the NSA’s unrestricted ability to target
individuals, obtain and manipulate information, and control users’
internet connection globally.37 The global community was shaken by
the sheer amount of control one country exercised over worldwide
information. For example, the NSA collected email contact lists from
Yahoo, Gmail, Facebook and Hotmail, tapped into phone calls of
world leaders including German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and
obtained information from communications and tech companies and
forced their silence.38 The European Court of Justice said such an
approach “must be regarded as compromising the essence of the
fundamental right to respect for private life, as guaranteed by Article
7 of the Charter [of Fundamental Rights of the European Union].”39

35

Kalev Leetaru, The Data Brokers So Powerful Even Facebook Bought Their Data—
But They Got Me Wildly Wrong, FORBES (Apr. 5, 2018, 4:08 PM), https://www.forbes.
com/sites/kalevleetaru/2018/04/05/the-data-brokers-so-powerful-even-facebook-bou
ght-their-data-but-they-got-me-wildly-wrong/#112ea6fc3107.
36
Edward Snowden: Leaks that exposed US spy programme, BBC NEWS (Jan. 17,
2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-23123964.
37
Snowden Revelations, LAWFARE, https://www.lawfareblog.com/snowden-revelati
ons (lasted visited on Oct. 26, 2020).
38
Id.
39
Paul M. Schwartz, Global Data Privacy: The EU Way, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 771, 800
(2019) (citing Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650
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Although this information signals a need for reform in the
United States’ privacy law, even the most ridged opposers of data
collection do not seek to end all data collection.40 Mainstream reform
proposals “would require that the data be stored by those entities who
collected it (e.g., telecommunications providers), or other nongovernmental third parties, with the government only authorized to
access the data upon a more specific, individualized showing of
relevance.”41 The Snowden disclosures exhibited how much control
just one government can have over massive amounts of information.
Nevertheless, even a worst-case-scenario could not entirely negate the
benefits and need for big data.
This Note will take a business-oriented approach, assessing
ways in which businesses can balance big data benefits while limiting
their liability under domestic and foreign privacy law. By bridging the
gap between international trade law and privacy regulations, this Note
will explain the interaction between these fields and what it means for
international business. Specifically, this Note will address one of the
most precarious relationships between the European Union and the
United States. Data transfers between the United States and European
Union are imperative to maintaining this $7.1 trillion economic
relationship.42 Sustaining this relationship requires a balance of
adequate privacy protections that do not hinder business relations.43
Part II of this Note will examine the relationship between
privacy and trade via cross-border data regulations and discrepancies
between European Union and United States privacy regulations. Part
III will discuss the historical and current issues posed by data privacy
¶ 94 (Oct. 6, 2015), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62
014CJ0362).
40
Stephen I. Vladeck, Big Data Before and After Snowden, J. NAT’L SEC. L. POL’Y
333, 335 (2014).
41
Id.
42
William Alan Reinsch & Isabella Frymoyer, Transatlantic Data Flows:
Permanently Broken or Temporarily Fractured?, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD.,
(Aug. 31, 2020), https://www.csis.org/analysis/transatlantic-data-flows-permanentlybroken-or-temporarily-fractured.
43
Letter from Deputy Assistant Secretary James Sullivan on the Schrems II Decision,
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE (Sept. 28, 2020), https://www.commerce.gov/about/letterdeputy-assistant-secretary-james-sullivan-schrems-ii-decision [hereinafter White
Paper Cover Letter].
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regulations on transatlantic trade. Part IV will address the
interpretations of the problematic Schrems II decision and its effects on
transatlantic trade. Part V will analyze the suggested actions prescribes
by both European Union and United States representatives and
proposes ways United States companies can mitigate the negative
effects of the Schrems II decision.
II.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADE AND PRIVACY

Data has become a vital part of daily life in every aspect,
ranging from global trade to communicating with family. A crucial
aspect of facilitating data transfers is the allowance of cross-border
data flows that allow information to be shared internationally,
connecting the globe to valuable information, social experiences, and
economic opportunities. Cross-border commerce is estimated to have
contributed hundreds of billions of dollars annually to United States’
GDP.44 Undoubtedly, data transfers are essential to growth and
innovation in all sectors of life.45
However, the benefits of data are at risk of hinderance by
restrictions on cross-border data flows. The rise of big data incited
regulations, which each country imposes on cross-border data
transfers to protect citizens’ privacy. Different countries have taken
varying legal approaches to protecting their citizens’ privacy.
However, the externalities of these regulations inevitably affect the
economic trade relationships between countries. Regulations
inherently put the burden of cost on private entities who seek to send
or process their data abroad, thus affecting international economic
relations.46
Data privacy regulations are classified by different
taxonomies. One of the most popular taxonomies used to classify
regulatory approaches is the “default regulatory positions” involving
44

The Invalidation of the EU-US Privacy Shield and the Future of Transatlantic Data
Flows: Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Comm. On Com., Sci. and Transp., 116th
Cong. 2–3 (2020) (testimony of Noah J. Phillips, Comm’n Fed. Trade Comm’n.)
[hereinafter Phillips Testimony].
45
Id.
46
Martina Ferracane, Restrictions on Cross-Border data flows: a taxonomy, 2–3 ECIPE
WORKING PAPERS 2 (2017), https://ecipe.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Restriction
s-on-cross-border-data-flows-a-taxonomy-final1.pdf.
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geographical and organizational approaches.47 The geographical, or
adequacy, approach focuses on the data protection policies of the
country of import.48 This approach analyzes the level of protection
afforded by the country of import. Usually, it requires the country of
import to provide the same or similar protections to the data subjects
as provided by the country of export.49 European Union regulatory
laws are “prime” examples of the adequacy approach.50 Countries that
use the adequacy approach may still allow organizations from
countries that do not meet adequacy standards by implementing
appropriate safeguards.51 This is where the geographical and
organizational approaches intersect.
The organizational, or accountability, approach focuses on the
policies and procedures of specific organizations importing and
exporting the data and makes them accountable for the personal data
they process.52 This approach “ensures that the original collector of the
personal information remains accountable for compliance with the
original privacy framework that applied when and where the data was
collected, regardless of the other organizations or countries to which
the personal data travels subsequently.”53 Unlike the geographical
approach, the country of imports’ laws need not satisfy an adequate
level of protection. The organizational approach only requires that the
importing organization continue to apply the protections applicable
under the exporting organization’s law.54 By its nature, the
accountability approach is less restrictive compared to the adequacy
approach. However, it imposes tremendous compliance
responsibilities and potential liabilities on individual organizations.
Under this approach, organizations must implement “appropriate
privacy policies that are approved by senior management and
implemented by a sufficient number of staff; train . . . employees to
47

CHRISTOPHER KUNER, TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS AND DATA PRIVACY LAW 76
(2013).
48
Id. at 64.
49
Id. at 66.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 71.
52
Id.
53
Malcolm Crompton, et al., The Australian Dodo Case: An Insight for Data
Protection Regulation, BLOOMBERG BNA PRIV. & SEC. L. REP. 180 (Jan. 26, 2009).
54
KUNER, supra note 47, at 71–72.
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comply with these policies; adopt . . . internal oversight and external
verification programmes; provide . . . transparency to individuals as to
the policies and compliance with them; and adopt . . . mechanisms to
enforce compliance.”55 Examples of the accountability approach
include the APEC Privacy Framework and the Madrid Resolution.56
An example of an adequacy regulation with accountability
characteristics is the European Union law recognizing standard
contractual agreements (SCCs) and binding corporate rules (BCRs),57
which the next section will discuss.
III.

DATA-PRIVACY REGULATIONS AND TRANSATLANTIC TRADE
A.

Contrasting Historical Approaches to Data Privacy

The discrepancies between the European Union and the
United States approaches regarding privacy concerns stem from
history. Rather than a greater distrust of government oversight, as
exhibited by the United States, the European Union focuses its privacy
concerns on protecting consumers’ personal information from private
corporations and commercial entities.58 Many forms of data gathering
that are commonplace in the United States, the European Union
restricts. For example, “employers monitoring their employees’
private communications” or “checkout clerks requesting . . . addresses
and telephone numbers from patrons” is allowed in the United States
but prohibited in the EU.59 The United States takes a different
approach by protecting certain types of sensitive data, e.g., medical
and financial information.60 The sectoral approach greatly deviates
from the EU’s approach, which is a universal approach that protects
all personal information.61
55

Id.
Id.
57
Id. at 72–73.
58
SOMA, supra note 29, at 46.
59
Id. at 46–47.
60
The Invalidation of the EU-US Privacy Shield and the Future of Transatlantic Data
Flows: Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Comm. On Com., Sci. and Transp., 116th
Cong. 3 (2020) (statement of James M. Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Int’l
Trade Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce) [hereinafter Sullivan Testimony].
61
Id.
56
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The European Union and United States trade and privacy
relationship began with the European Union Directive on Data
Protections of 1995, which created explicit obligations for private
entities and remedies for individuals.62 Eventually, the European
Union invalidated the Data Protection Directive of 1995, providing
that United States law was still not “adequate,” which spurred the
creation of the Safe Harbor Framework in 2000.63 The Safe Harbor
Framework was an attempt at an accountability approach that allowed
data transfers between European Union and United States
organizations, even though United States law was inadequate by
European Union standards.64 The Safe Harbor framework was
invalidated in 2013 by the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) decision
in Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner (Schrems I).65 Schrems I
provided that the Safe Harbor framework was invalid because it
allowed government interferences despite the directive’s protections.
Overall, it failed to provide legal remedies for data subjects, and it
blocked national supervisory authorities from exercising their
powers.66
In 2016, the Privacy Shield Framework was approved and
deemed by the European Commission as “adequate to enable data
transfers under European Union law.”67 Similar to the Safe Harbor
Framework, the Privacy Shield implemented an accountability
approach to allow data transfers between organizations that
implemented SCCs and BCRs.68 This agreement became the legal basis
for European Union and United States businesses to continue data
transfers.69 Since then, more than 5,300 businesses have relied on this
62

SOMA, supra note 29, at 47.
Jay Kramer & Sean Hoar GDPR, Part I: History Of European Data Protection Law,
MONDAQ (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/data-protection/643
052/gdpr-part-i-history-of-european-data-protection-law.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Privacy Shield Overview, Privacy Shield Framework, https://www.privacyshield.
gov/Program-Overview (last visited Feb. 16, 2022).
68
Caitlin Fennessy, The ‘Schrems II’ Decision: EU-US Data Transfers in Question,
INT’L ASSOC. OF PRIV. PRO. (July 16, 2020), https://iapp.org/news/a/the-schrems-iidecision-eu-us-data-transfers-in-question/.
69
Id.
63
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framework to conduct trade in compliance with European Union data
protection rules.70
In 2018, the European Union implemented the GDPR. The
EU’s goals for creating the GDPR included unifying the regulations of
the 27 nations in the EU, improving foreign data transfers, and
improving data subjects’ control over their identifying personal data.71
The GDPR is a regulation that falls under the “adequacy approach”
with some characteristics resembling the “accountability approach.”72
The GDPR requires European Union organizations to examine the
foreign country’s data protection process. If these processes do not
abide by European Union laws and regulations, then the data must be
returned to the exporting organization or destroyed.73 The GDPR is
known for being one of the most demanding privacy regulations
imposed on cross-border transfers. Notably, the GDPR codifies
additional requirements for handling data, i.e., stricter conditions for
consent, “a broader definition of sensitive data, new provisions on
protecting children’s privacy, mandatory breach reporting obligation
and the inclusions of the ‘right to be forgotten.’”74 Initially, the GDPR
worked in tandem with the Privacy Shield Framework under the
accountability approach.75 However, this short-lived supplementation
was ended by an ECJ decision invalidating the Privacy Shield for
requiring insufficient projection under the GDPR, which will be
further discussed in the subsequent section.
B.

Schrems II Decision and Effects on Trade

Although the GDPR has created some difficulties for
transatlantic data transfers, it wasn’t until the ECJ’s decision in Data
Protection Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland and Maximillian Schrems
(“Schrems II”) that transatlantic trade began to feel the full force of the
GDPR.76 In July 2020, the Schrems II decision invalidated the Privacy
70

White Paper Cover Letter, supra note 43.
Kramer, supra note 63.
72
See supra Part II.
73
Fennessy, supra note 68; see also Schrems II, at ¶ 143.
74
Kramer, supra note 63.
75
See supra pp. 9–10.
76
Phillips Testimony, supra note 44, at 6.
71
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Shield Framework and required new obligations for mechanisms like
SCCs and BJRs.77 The ECJ invalidated the Privacy Shield for two
reasons: (1) United States surveillance programs were not limited
enough to abide by European Union law and (2) data subjects lack
sufficient judicial redress regarding the United States surveillance
programs.78 Particularly, Schrems II held that neither Section 702 of the
United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA 702) nor the
Executive Order on United States Intelligence Activities (EO 12333)
meet the minimum requirement to satisfy European Union law
because those regulations are not limited to what is “strictly
necessary.”79 Further, the Schrems II decision found that the United
States law fails to provide a means of individual redress that protects
individuals from the prior mentioned United States regulations
allowing for such broad surveillance.80 This holding creates a
considerable problem for the 70% of small and mid-sized Privacy
Shield participants with minimal legal expertise and resources.81
Moreover, the Schrems II decision requires new obligations for
mechanisms like SCCs and BCRs to be sufficient.82 Under these new
obligations, businesses must verify on a case-by-case basis “whether
foreign legal protections concerning government access to personal
data meet European Union standards.”83 If the recipient country’s
legal protections do not meet European Union standards, like the
United States, then organizations must implement appropriate
safeguards or refrain from transmitting data.84 This puts a heavy
burden on organizations and their privacy professionals to determine
what constitutes “appropriate safeguards” and how to implement
them. Instead of relying on the protocols under their current SCCs and
BCRs, now businesses must assess their data transfers on a case-by-

77

Kramer, supra note 63; see also Bradley A. Brooker, et al., The Need for Clarity
After Schrems II, LAWFARE (Sept. 29, 2020, 11:54 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.
com/need-clarity-after-schrems-ii.
78
Fennessy, supra note 68; see also Schrems II, at ¶¶184–85, 191–93, 195–97, 201.
79
Schrems II, at ¶¶184–85.
80
Id. at ¶¶ 191.
81
Brooker, supra note 77.
82
Id.
83
Fennessy, supra note 68.
84
Brooker, supra note 77.

2022

BIG DATA, BOTH FRIEND AND FOE

113

case basis and modify their current protocols to comply with European
Union standards.85
Businesses who relied on SCCs and BCRs under the Privacy
Shield Framework must now reassess and restructure their contracts
and rules to comply with the new regulations, creating significant
uncertainty.86 Until the Schrems II decision, standardized SCCs and
BCRs allowed an organizational approach to supplement the legal
basis for data transfers to countries whose data protection policies do
not satisfy European Union rules. However, the Schrems II decision
invalidated standardized procedures. It now requires organizations to
review SCCs and BCRs on a case-by-case basis to ensure GDPR is
satisfied.87 This case-by-case evaluation of these self-imposed clauses
puts tremendous strain on small and mid-size businesses with limited
legal resources. This leaves many European Union and United States
businesses uncertain regarding their current protocols as well as
whether they comply with European Union law. Ever since the ECJ
found that protections from the United States government were
lacking, the burden has fallen on companies to determine whether the
ECJ’s concerns apply to their specific transfers and if additional
protocols can remedy these issues.88
The Schrems II decision prompted great uncertainty and
polarized opinions on what the future of the transatlantic relationship
would look like. For example, in May 2021, the High Court of Ireland
issued a judgment suspending all Facebook data transfers finding that
the Schrems II decision is binding and “United States law does not
provide a level of protection that is essentially equivalent to that of
European Union law.”89 The judgment goes even further to find that
current SCCs cannot compensate for the inadequate protection
provided by United States law.90 The implications of these findings are
that Facebook is forced to stop transferring European citizens’
85
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information to the United States91 To survive in the EU, Facebook and
other tech companies will likely be required to process European
Union data within the bloc.92 Only the absolutely “necessary” transfers
can still happen between transatlantic users, otherwise the data will
remain in its respective “safe” countries.93 If this view is adopted, it
will do more than damage tech and digital sectors as it will also inhibit
all of the beneficial aspects of big data and information sharing, from
the health sector’s COVID-19 medical research to the economy as a
whole currently facing uncharted economic difficulties. The High
Court’s interpretation of the Schrems II decision is a sweeping one,
ultimately invalidating the use SCCs, which is vehemently opposed by
parties on both sides of the Atlantic.
IV.

INTERPRETATIONS OF SCHREMS II DECISION

Although the Schrems II decision invalidates the Privacy
Framework, it does so on the fundamental rationale that the United
States permits over-board governmental discretion of national security
surveillance, citing FISA 702 and EO 12333.94 The Schrems litigation is
described as “a creature of distrust” by Professor Neil Richards, a
privacy expert asked by the Data Protection Commissioner of Ireland
to provide his independent expert testimony in the Schrems II
litigation.95 The Snowden Disclosures and the United States’ lack of
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implementation of uniform privacy laws instigated this distrust.96 The
EU, time and again, has invalidated attempts to bridge the adequacy
gap of United States privacy law. However, The United States
government claims that because of the limited and fragmentary
rationale in Schrems II, many SCCs may be sufficient to comply with
European Union laws regardless of Schrems II. United States privacy
and trade experts have noted that the government surveillance
concern is probably inapplicable to most data transfers to the United
States and therefore should not interfere with compliance of SCCs.97
This is because most data transfers to the United States from the
European Union are unlikely to be the target of government
surveillance.98 Additionally, the United States government and some
United States privacy professionals’ claim that the ECJ failed to
consider other United States laws protecting privacy and the
limitations the United States has set for national security surveillance.
The United States argument is that since the Schrems II decision
is only concerned about FISA 702 and EO 12333, companies who are
not subject to FISA 702 and EO 12333, or “electronic communications
providers,” should easily satisfy the new SCCs self-assessment
requirement under Schrems II.99 The United States Department of
Commerce’s White Paper, released in response to the Schrems II
decision therein, argues that although the ECJ finds United States law
insufficient in limiting government surveillance, the United States
government would not collect data in which it has no interest.100 The
White Paper concludes that United States law provides adequate
96
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protection and the Schrems II decision fails to take into account
important limitations of FISA 702 and EO 12333. The White Paper
addresses arguments on both FISA and EO 12333, refuting the ECJ’s
claims that these protocols are not sufficient to provide data subjects
with adequate protections and remedies.101 Further, the White Paper
concludes that companies relying on current SCCs are in compliance
with the GDPR.102 This section will discuss both European Union and
United States interpretations of the Schrems II decision for FISA 702
and EO 12333 and SCCs. Each discussion will first present the
American arguments of each legal authority’s limitations then discuss
potential issues in the Schrems II decision rationale. In conclusion, each
section will discuss the reliability of the advice given by both the
United States and EU.
A.

The FISA 702 Discussion

The White Paper, along with privacy experts articles, is the
primary source of arguments for the purpose of this section. First, the
white paper asserts that FISA 702’s application is limited to electronic
communications providers and foreign information. Targeting a
United States citizen’s data or data relating to persons located in the
United States is prohibited under FISA 702.103 FISA 702 does, however,
authorize the United States to collect foreign intelligence from nonAmericans located outside the United States104 Under FISA 702, the
United States government targets foreign communications via
information provided by electronic communications providers; i.e.,
Google, Facebook, Yahoo; and direct tapping into data flows through
fiber-optic cables that carry Internet traffic.105 These techniques are
required to filter out any communications that are “wholly
domestic.”106 United States privacy experts argue that FISA 702
searches cannot target data transfers under SCCs because SCCs
101
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“necessarily entail a contract between a data exporter in Europe and a
data importer in the United States”107 Since the transfer involves a
United States importer, FISA 702 cannot be the legal basis for
government surveillance.108 However, FISA 702 presents a potential
loophole for domestic surveillance by allowing for “incidental”
collection of domestic intelligence.109
Opponents of FISA 702 point out that government agencies
still obtain United States persons’ data by claiming the domestic
information obtained was “incidental” and not “intentionally
targeted.”110 Notwithstanding the potential United States
constitutional violations of freedom of warrantless searches and
seizures, this loophole incidentally jeopardizes international trade
relations.111 This is a critical flaw in FISA 702.
In rebuttal, the United States argues that regardless of whether
FISA 702 is overbroad, domestic companies are outside of FISA 702’s
purpose and scope and therefore are not a target of surveillance. Thus,
domestic companies protected from surveillance should not be subject
to the Schrems II decision. The United States government assures that
companies with ordinary commercial operations and ordinary
personal data transfers would have no reason to “believe United States
intelligence agencies would seek to collect that data.”112 Consequently,
there is no threat to European Union data subjects’ information.
Additionally, the United States government asserts that FISA 702 has
adequate supervisions ensuring proper targeting of individuals thus,
it is sufficiently limited to what is necessary and essential to the public
interest.113
“[B]efore the United States government may acquire under
FISA 702 the communications data of any person (including an
107
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European Union citizen or resident) meeting certain targeting
restrictions, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) must
… approve a written certification submitted by the Attorney General
and the Director of National Intelligence jointly authorizing the
collection activities for up to one year.”114
FISA 702 authorization requests are required to define how the
government determined which specific persons’ communications are
to be acquired, be limited to a specific type of purpose, and specify
how the agency will use it to acquire the type of foreign intelligence
specified in the certification.115 Independent intelligence oversight
attorneys with the Department of Justice (DOJ) review every targeting
assessment made by the NSA for compliance.116 The White Paper
further outlines the limitations of FISA 702 and independent
departments’ supervisory roles that protect from overbroad data
collection.
Further privacy safeguards were added to FISA 702 in 2017,
including:
”(1) requiring that with each annual FISA 702
certification, the government must submit and the
FISC must approve querying procedures, in addition
to targeting procedures and minimization procedures;
(2) requiring additional steps including notification to
Congress before the government may resume
acquisition of “about” collection under FISA 702;
(3) amending the enabling statute for the PCLOB to
allow it to better exercise its advisory and oversight
functions;
(4) adding the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
NSA to the list of agencies required to maintain their
own Privacy and Civil Liberties Officers, instead of
being subject only to their parent department-level
officers, to advise their agencies on privacy issues and
ensure there are adequate procedures to receive,
investigate, and redress complaints from individuals
114
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who allege that the agency violated their privacy or
civil liberties;
(5) extending whistleblower protections to contract
employees at intelligence agencies; and
(6) imposing several additional disclosure and
reporting requirements on the government, including
to provide annual good faith estimates of the number
of FISA 702 targets.”117
Moreover, according to the White Paper, the Schrems II
decision failed to address that United States law does provide redress
for FISA 702 violations.118 The FISA statute itself provides a cause of
action for individuals, both United States and non-United States
citizens, for violations of FISA 702.119 The White Paper contends that
the Schrems II court did not sufficiently evaluate United States law, as
it failed to acknowledge that FISA 702 provides both United States
citizens foreign individuals who are subject to United States
surveillance. If any individual, United States citizen or not, is
unlawfully targeted and whose communications are used or disclosed
may seek compensatory and punitive damages, as well as attorney’s
fees.120 Even beyond the FISA statute, the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act, provides another separate cause of action for FISA
violations.121 The Administrative Procedure Act is another means in
which an individual may challenge unlawful government access to
personal data.122
These arguments, however, have been unsuccessful in
persuading European Union entities. The Schrems II court altogether
declined to consider these assertions. In applying the newly decided
precedent from Schrems II, the High Court of Ireland also refused to
consider these arguments, although they were brought to the attention
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of the court.123 Whilst, this is no surprise, as these arguments would
require the European Union to trust that the United States government
abides by the FISA 702 limitations when there is evidence to suggest
that the United States does not.124 Thus, United States companies
relying on SCCs are in danger of losing trade relations with European
Union partners because of the loophole in FISA 702.125 Unless the
United States entity can sufficiently prove that it is not a target of
government surveillance, which cannot be definitively known by a
company, there is no way for companies, on their own, to satisfy their
self-assessment obligation under Schrems II.
Whether the United States’ arguments are considered or not,
the Schrems II decision is final and binding, which makes these ex post
facto arguments ineffective in protecting trade between European
Union and United States organizations, as we now know it. In order to
maintain stable trade relations with the EU, Congress or individual
states must enact further legislation.
B.

The EO 12333 Discussion

The EO 12333 guides intelligence agencies on conducting
overseas surveillance in situations where the United States
Constitution does not apply.126 The United States assures that EO
12333 provides full protection of United States persons’ privacy rights,
thus EO 12333 does not provide a legal basis for which the government
may target data transmissions “to or from the United States by United
States companies under SCCs.”127 The United States emphasizes that
safeguards are in place to protect from government overreach
regarding EO 12333, including the Presidential Policy Directive (PPD28) and the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF).128
Based on these policies and laws, United States privacy experts argue
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that the ECJ’s concerns about overbroad government surveillance are
irrelevant for many companies who rely on SCCs.129
First, presidential directives are a specific type of executive
order that “carry the force and effect of law.”130 For example, one
notable and effective presidential directive is George H.W. Bush’s
NSPM-4: Organization of the National Security Council and the
Homeland Security Council.131 President Barack Obama’s PPD-28,
(“PPD-28”) limits the use of bulk collections to only six categories: (1)
espionage and other threats from foreign powers; (2) terrorism; (3)
threats from weapons of mass destruction; (4) cybersecurity threats; (5)
threats to United States or allied forces; and (6) transnational criminal
threats.132 PPD-28 also requires that intelligence agencies treat foreign
personal information as protected United States citizens’ personal
information. PPD-28 forces intelligence agencies to intelligence
agencies to protect foreign citizens’ rights as they would for a United
States citizen and to adopt procedures to protect personal information,
regardless of nationality.133 PPD-28 only allows for the retention or
dissemination of a foreign persons’ personal information if
“comparable information concerning United States persons would be
permitted.”134
Another safeguard to limit United States government
surveillance to national security purposes is the NIPF.135 The NIPF has
both statutory and executive order authority via EO 12333.136 The NIPF
is the oversight body for EO 12333, which applies objective criteria to
limit “bulk collections,” which is the collection and storage of massive
amounts of data that includes United States citizen information to
specific national intelligence priorities and reviews agency requests for
collection to ensure each request is consistent with the specific criteria
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set forth.137 Irrespective of these safeguards, the ECJ is not convinced
the NIPF is sufficient to protect against these bulk collections. The
Schrems II decision takes issue with the mere potential the EO 12333
provides for bulk collection.138
However, bulk collection is “expressly prohibited” under FISA
and National Security Letters statutes.139 “Bulk data collection is
permitted only in other contexts, such as clandestine intelligence
activities involving overseas access to data.”140 Even the European
Union permits this type of foreign surveillance by its member states.141
The fact that the United States conducts global intelligence collection
should not interfere with transatlantic trade relations. There is a
limited expectation of privacy on global networks because any country
or individual who has the means obtain access to data transfers can do
so.
”Were the lawfulness of data transfers outside the EU
to depend on an assessment of intelligence agencies’
clandestine access to data outside a given destination
country while in transit, no data transfers could be
found lawful under EU standards because intelligence
agencies worldwide potentially could access the data
as it travels over global networks.”142
The European Union requires “essentially equivalent”
protection from the United States government.143 Since the ECJ has
never ruled on an European Union member state’s overseas access to
foreign data, it follows that the United States need not be subject to
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additional scrutiny but equal scrutiny.144 It is widely agreed that
gathering intelligence on both foreign and domestic transfers is
extremely important to public safety and security, as we will discuss
in the next subsection.145
Because EO 12333 is substantially different in its data collection
scope than FISA 702, it has a more favorable chance of passing the
GDPR’s standards with some slight modifications. EO 12333 is a
purely foreign intelligence collection that falls outside the GDPR’s
jurisdiction, unlike FISA 702 and its problematic loopholes. Since the
European Union does not have strict regulation for what its member
states may collect on the foreign front, the Schrems II decision should
not have passed judgment on a United States policy that falls outside
the EU’s regulations.
V.
NAVIGATING THE UNCHARTED WATERS POST -SCHREMS II:
SUGGESTED ACTIONS TO SATISFY GDPR COMPLIANCE
This section discusses who the GDPR affects and what
difficulties they face based on their circumstances. Both United States
and European Union approaches to GDPR compliance will be
discussed, with advice from both government agencies and
independent privacy experts with an emphasis on the European Data
Protection
Board’s
(“EDPB”)
final
recommendations
on
supplementary measures in the context of international transfer
safeguards, such as SCCs.
Schrems II follows a pattern of invalidation of privacy
agreements between the European Union and the United States, which
is likely to continue absent legislative intervention.146 The United
States Congress votes on a federal privacy law proposal almost every
legislative session in recent years but has yet to pass any legislation on
a federal privacy policy since 1974, leaving up to the individual states.
Thus far, four states—California, Colorado, Nevada, Virginia—have
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enacted comprehensive privacy laws.147 State legislative session has
begun in most states, twelve of which have proposed privacy bills
circulating in committees.148 Waiting on state legislatures to decide the
fate of businesses and private entities profitability and liability is not
recommended. Whether these bills become law is unknown and out of
private entitles’ control. Suppose these bills even become law, they
must be comprehensive enough to satisfy the GDPR for private entities
to rely on them. Businesses should intervene in what they can control,
their own privacy protocols.
The GDPR has perforce altered the future of the transatlantic
trade and will require stricter privacy protection measures. Despite the
inconvenience of change, the GDPR protocols provide many benefits.
Most importantly, the protection of privacy, which should already be
of the highest priority to businesses who mainly transact over the
internet. Part I established that, due to the growth of internet
transactions, it is of extreme consequence to create company initiatives
that protect consumers’ privacy and personal information from cyberattacks and other unauthorized usage. To determine the most effective
way to adapt, United States business must first understand who is
affected by the GDPR and what actions will ensure compliance.
A.
II

United States Approach to Compliance Post-Schrems

As discussed previously,149 the White Paper instructs
companies to take the stance that most companies are not subject to
FISA 702 of EO 12333.150 The basis of this rationale is that these data
transfers of no interest to the United States government and adequate
safeguards ensure that government agencies properly target
individuals and data collection is limited to what is necessary.151
Under this theory, there are two groups of companies: (1) companies
147
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that received order(s) to disclose information under FISA 702; and (2)
companies relying on SCCs, including companies that are and are not
electronic service providers. Companies should act according with
each group it belongs to. Regardless of group, all companies should
articulate that their data transfers are directed to persons (or
organizations) located in the United States, which falls outside of FISA
702 and EO 12333 authority; thus, making their SCCs adequate.152
Companies should also consider stating in public, corporate privacy
policies that data transfers to the United States pursuant to SCCs are
United States person communications.
i. Companies Ordered to Disclose Information Under FISA
702: GDPR’s Public Interest Derogation
First, the United States suggests that companies ordered to
disclose information under FISA 702 may rely on Article 49 of the
GDPR’s “public interest” derogation. The European Union continues
to recognize the public interest derogation as an exception to data
collection and sharing “in the spirit of reciprocity for international
cooperation” and because it serves an “important public interest.”153
In the Schrems II decision, the ECJ upheld these derogations to
maintain a cooperative relationship between United States and
European Union intelligence agencies for public safety and security.154
The information obtained through FISA 702 requests helps “counter a
variety of threats, including international terrorism, the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, and the activities of hostile foreign
cyber actors.”155 The information obtained through FISA 702 requests
has proven to be vital in investigating international crimes involving
citizens of foreign nations.156 The United States government insists that
152
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FISA 702’s international public safety benefits outweigh its privacy
concerns, and abolishing this data collection could create serious
public safety issues.157
Suppose a company has received a FISA 702 order, in that case,
it may apply this approach by articulating this to the EDPB while
conducting the newly required assessments of SCCs compliance.158
Companies should also thoroughly document and assess FISA 702
requests to ensure the requests are sufficiently limited and nonincidental to report to the EDPB.159 Companies should consider
including information on “whether or not they have ever received
national security intelligence collection demands under 702 or 12333
with respect to European Union data transferred to the United States
under any Article 46 mechanism (i.e., SCCs, Privacy Shield, binding
corporate rules, etc.)” in their EDPB assessments and public privacy
statements.160 This disclosure conveys a sense of transparency and
compliance that is a core goal of the GDPR.161 Transparency reports
and internal records and statements have been deemed a possible
source of information to assess an importer’s compliance.162 Also, if
countries.” As an example of such a case, on December 31, 2016, a gunman killed 39
people and injured 69 others at a Turkish nightclub before fleeing the scene. Public
reporting indicates the wounded and dead included European Union citizens from
France, Germany, and Bulgaria. Almost immediately, Turkish law enforcement and
United States intelligence officials began cooperating to identify and locate the
shooter. Part of that effort included intelligence collection under FISA 702. The
information derived from FISA 702 collection ultimately led police to an apartment
in Istanbul where an Uzbek national was arrested, and firearms, ammunition, drones,
and over $200,000 in cash were seized. This individual was tried and convicted, and
in September 2020 was sentenced to life imprisonment.”) For more examples, see
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157
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applicable, a company should establish that it is not a communications
service provider for the purposes of FISA 702.163 Finally, companies
who receive demands under FISA 702 should “[c]ommit to
challenging any 702 directive it in good faith believes is
unauthorized.”164
ii. Companies Relying on SCCs
Companies relying on SCCs should first determine whether
they are an electronic services provider under FISA 702. FISA statute
defines electronic communication service providers as “telecom
carriers, ISPs, email providers, cloud services, and ‘any other
communication service provider who has access to wire or electronic
communications either as such communications are transmitted or as
such communications are stored.’”165 The majority of organizations
engaging in transatlantic data transfers are not electronic service
providers.166
If an organization is not an electronic communications service
provider, then it would be beneficial to articulate to both United States
intelligence agencies and EDPB that the organization is not an
electronic service provider for purposes of FISA 702. Therefore it
should not be targeted or issued any directives under FISA 702.167
Organizations should include this information in their selfassessments of their SCCs. Since the company is not an electronic
records engaging the liability of the importer and/or issued by internal positions with
some autonomy such as internal auditors, DPOs, etc.”).
163
Raul, supra note 94, at 14.
164
Id.
165
Id. at 7 (quoting 50 U.S.C. 1881b(4)); see also Evidence in Criminal Investigations,
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (2009), at 117–118, available at
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminalccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ssmanual2009.pdf (However, the Stored Communications
Act provides that agencies may not construe corporate email systems to constitute an
electronic service provider. See Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining
Electronic.).
166
Id. at 6 (“i.e., the discrete set of companies in the business of transmitting (or
storing) communications for third parties – as opposed to the vast number of
companies transferring their own customer, employee or business data from their
bases in Europe to their bases in the U.S.”).
167
Id. at 14.
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service provider and not at risk of being targeted under FISA 702, the
company will be able to adhere to their contractual obligations under
the SCCs, and these transfers “will provide adequate protections for
the privacy rights of individuals whose personal data is transferred
pursuant to the SCCs.”168
Suppose an organization is an electronic communications
service provider, in that case, it may be helpful to note that:
”[the] majority of companies have never received
orders to disclose data under FISA 702 and have never
otherwise provided personal data to United States
intelligence agencies. Neither would such companies
have any indication that a United States intelligence
agency has sought to obtain their data unilaterally
outside the United States under the authority of EO
12333.”169
It remains crucial, however, to inform the EDPB of the
organization’s commitment to challenging any 702 directive it believes
is unauthorized.170 Further, organizations that share data with
communications service providers should inform the communications
service providers upon commencement of service with them, “and
periodically thereafter, that communications emanating from the
company’s domain to a recipient in the United States is a United States
person communication to a person located in the United States”171
Additionally, the organization should assert that it will challenge any
FISA 702 directive that is issued to collect a service provider’s “United
States-bound communications from the [European Economic Area],
and request that the service provider provide meaningful advance
notice of any such attempted collection to the full extent permitted by
law.”172
168

Pulina Whitaker et al., The End of the US-EU Privacy Shield, But Standard
Contractual Clauses Remain Valid, Morgan Lewis Publications (July 17, 2020),
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The United States Department of Commerce, via the White
Paper, and United States privacy experts argue that companies may
use this information to satisfy their self-assessment obligations under
Schrems II.173
B.

EU Approach to Schrems II

It is unlikely that the United States approach alone will satisfy
the EU’s strict data protection regulations, although it may have some
persuasive influence.174 The United States approach seems to treat the
symptoms of the Schrems II decision rather than the underlying
disease. To treat the transatlantic problem, the United States will need
comprehensive consumer privacy reform implemented by Congress
as well as the federal surveillance reform.175 However, this reform may
be too little, too late for United States businesses currently in danger
of losing trade relations with the EU. This section will address how
United States businesses may independently adopt GDPR protocols to
help them achieve compliance with European Union standards that
will protect them from both domestic and international liability and
risk.
Unlike the High Court of Ireland, the EDPB found that the EJC
upheld the use of SCCs on the condition that data controllers or data
processors relying on SCCs:
”verify, on a case-by-case basis and, where
appropriate, in collaboration with the recipient of the
data, whether the law of the third country of
destination ensures adequate protection, under
European Union law, of personal data transferred
pursuant to standard data protection clauses, by
providing, where necessary, additional safeguards to
those offered by those clauses.”176
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On June 18, 2021, the EDPB adopted its final recommendations
(“Recommendation”) on how European Union data exporters and
third-country importers can ensure compliance with Schrems II
holdings.177 The Recommendation provides guidance for how
European Union exporters should assess third-party countries’ laws or
practices which “impinges on the effectiveness of the appropriate
safeguards contained in the Article 46 GDPR transfer tools,” i.e. SCCs,
and “[identify] appropriate supplementary measures where
needed.”178 The Recommendation advises that exporters, while
conducting the required case-by-case verification of GDPR compliance
of the third country importer, should collaborate with third country
importers to ensure the appropriate safeguards are in place for the
transfers.179 This Note will expand on the role of importers pursuant
to the Recommendation.
The Recommendation outlines a six-step roadmap (“EDPB
Roadmap”) to assist in the assessment of third countries and the
measures that can be taken to safeguard the transfer of personal
data:180
1.
2.

Know your transfers
Identify the transfer tools you are relying on
• Adequacy decisions
• Article 46 GDPR transfer tools (including
SCCs and BCRs)
• Derogations
3.
Assess whether the Article 46 GDPR transfer
tool you are relying on is effective in light of all
circumstances of the transfer
• Transfer factors
• Assessing laws
177

Eur. Data Prot. Bd., Recommendations 01/2020 on measures that supplement
transfer tools to ensure compliance with the EU level of protection of personal data 1
(June 18, 2021), https://edpb.europa.eu/system/files/2021-06/edpb_recommendations
_202001vo.2.0_supplementarymeasurestransferstools_en.pdf [hereinafter Recomme
ndation].
178
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• Assessment outcomes
4.
Adopt supplementary measures
5.
Take procedural steps if you have identified
effective supplementary measures Re-evaluate at
appropriate intervals.181
The first step of the EDPB Roadmap advises exporters to
“know [their] transfers.”182 Exporters are required to know where the
personal data they export ends up in order to ensure that it is afforded
the “essentially equivalent level of protection wherever it is
processed.”183 As importers, it is your best interest to aide exporters in
understanding where the personal data imported will be processed,
stored, and the procedures used in this process. Importers should
inform the exporters of the rationale and purpose for the adequacy,
relevancy, and extent of the data that is being transferred. To maintain
full awareness of the data imported, organizations must record and
“map” all transfers. One crucial protocol that the GDPR requires to
record and map data is the Record of Processing Activities (ROPA).184
Implementing a ROPA would help to ensure that an organization’s
SCC is adequate and complies with protecting personal data.
”[T]he ROPA describes the exact usage of the data, the
technical and organisational measures, that you have in place for the
protection of the data, it shows you who is affected by a processing
and it also shows you the recipient of a processing and possible data
processors are also listed there. A fundamental risk analysis should
also be included in a ROPA.”185
The GDPR requires a ROPA from every organization or
individual processing personal data, also known as “data
controllers.”186 First, an organization must establish whether it is a
controller or a processor. A processor is an organization or individual
181
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who processes personal data on behalf of the controller.187 A controller
“determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal
data.”188 In other words, the controller is the entity collecting and using
the data, and the processor is how the controller synthesizes the data.
The controller’s ROPA information should be more extensive than a
processor’s and must include purposes of processing, whose data is
processed, what data is processed, etc.189 The processor mainly needs
to include the controller’s processing information, the type of
processing being done, if the information will be sent outside of the
EU, and technical and organizational measures taken.190 “The
controller is responsible for implementing appropriate technical and
organizational measures to ensure and demonstrate that processing is
compliant with GDPR; the controller shall implement data protection
policies and adhere to approved codes of conduct to demonstrate its
compliance.”191
Organizations with fewer than 250 employees are not required
to maintain a ROPA unless they partake in systematic processing.192
Systematic processing includes monthly processing of customer or
employee data—e.g., payroll, or anything that would not be
considered “occasional.”193 “[T]he only organizations that really might
not have to keep a very extensive ROPA are organizations that don’t
have a lot of employees and that don’t process any personal data other
than that either.”194 These types of entities are unique, and it is unlikely

187

Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of
personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive
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190
Id.
191
El- Gazzar, supra note 161, at 243.
192
Data Privacy Podcast, supra note 189, at 18:27.
193
Id.; see also Regulation (EU) 2016/679, art. 30, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 50–51.
194
Id. at 18:27; see also Regulation (EU) 2016/679, art. 30, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 50–
51.

2022

BIG DATA, BOTH FRIEND AND FOE

133

that many entities will fit into this exception.195 Further, the GDPR only
applies to data controllers outside of the European Union if these
entities are processing European Union data subjects’ personal
information regularly, including by offering goods and services and
marketing to European Union data subjects.196 A monetary transaction
need not occur to be subject to the GDPR; the outside entity only needs
to be observing and processing the behavior of data subjects within the
EU.197
Although completing a ROPA will require time and resources,
it is likely that many organizations already have some of the
information needed to begin their ROPA at hand via their data
inventory. A data inventory is an organized record of information an
organization creates, acquires, and stores. If an organization already
has a data inventory, it will make it much easier to create a ROPA.
Since knowing and effectively using data is a vital part of a successful
business, it is likely that most organizations already have some type of
data inventory established. Nevertheless, if an organization does not
have a data inventory, creating a ROPA will help begin the process of
creating a data inventory. Beyond limiting organizations’ liability, this
is another benefit of creating and maintaining a ROPA. Creating a
ROPA can help organizations in whatever stage their data inventory
is in. Data inventories improve efficiency, increase internal
accountability, and reduce risk. Failing to take advantage of an
organizations’ data can increase liability and financial risks.198 There is
also the risk that the organization is losing potential value by failing to
understand their data.199 Data helps to look at how companies
generate leads, make sales, how companies operate, how staff is being
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trained, and how invoices are being processed.200 This is the vital
information that leads organizations to success.
When creating an organization ROPA, the first step is to
determine the entity’s ambitions for its data collection and what goals
it would like to achieve from creating its data inventory.201 It is
important to set up an understandable overview that will be used as
an internal guide that explains the goals and the tasks needed to
achieve them.202 This overview should include instructions for
completing the ROPA tasks, descriptions of the information required,
explanations for what the information is for, and how it will be used.203
A detailed guide is the foundation for an accurate and valuable tool
because when the people who are assembling the ROPA understand
their work’s legal basis, they can more accurately complete their
tasks.204
After creating an internal guide, an organization should
assemble an internal team with its most knowledgeable people on data
privacy and those who are doing work with the personal data.205 The
people within the organization that are actually handling the personal
data should be the individuals filling out the activity information.206
Another suggestion is to include an individual who is familiar with the
mechanisms from each department—someone who “knows what kind
of systems they use, what kind of data they process, how they process
this data, so they can help you fill in the details.”207 A legal
representative and IT representative would also be helpful additions
to the team.208
The second step is to “verify the transfer tool your transfer
relies on.”209 The transfer tools are listed under Chapter V of the GDPR.
The European Commission (“EC”) allows third countries to obtain
compliance in three ways: (1) adequacy decisions, (2) Article 46 GDPR
200
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transfer tools, and (3) derogations. Depending on the country, region
or sector importing the data, some importers deemed adequate under
the EC’s adequacy decisions need not take any additional action
described herein.210 This, however, is not the case for the United States,
as Schrems II makes clear that United States law is insufficient for
GDPR compliance. Countries like the United States may rely on one of
the transfer tools listed under Articles 46 of the GDPR.
Article 46 GDPR transfer tools include the following: standard
data protection clauses (SCCs); binding corporate rules (BCRs); codes
of conduct; certification mechanisms; and ad hoc contractual
clauses.211 These tools must ensure that the personal data transferred
will benefit from an “essentially equivalent level of protection.212 If the
tools used are not sufficient to provide this level of protection,
additional measures, such as supplementary measures, may be
implemented. On July 4, 2021, the EC released a new set of SCCs for
the transfer of personal data to third countries, including an
explanation of the SCCs and a form document for SCCs.213
”[The] revised SCCs have a broader scope to reflect the
GDPR’s extraterritorial reach as well as more flexibility
to facilitate the use of SCCs in complex and constantly
evolving relationships. The revised SCCs also reflect a
strengthened data protection framework under the
GDPR and specific clauses to accommodate concerns
brought about by the Schrems II decision.”214
United States data importers should use these forms when
creating or updating their SCCs with the European Union exporter.
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Organizations must update their SCCs pursuant to the newly adopted
SCCs within eighteen months beginning June 2021.215
Beyond transfer tools, Article 49 provides for derogations are
unique and limited to specific situations. “[D]erogations . . . are
exemptions from the general principle that personal data may only be
transferred to third countries if an adequate level of protection is
provided for in the third country or if appropriate safeguards have
been adduced[.]”216 Organizations may use derogations, but the use of
these derogations may not contradict the rule that an adequate level of
protection be afforded to the data being transferred.
Once the transfer tool has been verified, Step Three advises
that the importer should assess whether the transfer tool being relied
on is “effective in light of all circumstances of the transfer.”217 This
assessment begins with determining if there is any law or practice in
the import country that impinges on the appropriate safeguards of the
transfer tool. In the United States, these laws or practices would be
FISA 702 and EO 12333.218 United States importers should incorporate
the United States guidance on GDPR compliance discussed in the
previous section.219 The White Paper provides guidance on asserting
that United States public authorities’ limited ability to access data from
a majority of United States importers.
Further, the importer should assess the characteristics of their
transfers to identify the specific laws and practices that apply to their
organization and type of transfers. For example, electronic service
providers may be subject to a greater likelihood of surveillance by the
United States government pursuant to United States law.220 Some
other factors to consider are the purpose for transfer, the types of
entities involved in processing, the sector where transfer occurs, the
categories of personal data, the location data that will be stored, the
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availability of remote access by third countries, the format of the
transferred data, and the possibility of subsequent transfers.221
The ROPA, or data mapping, will benefit this assessment, as it
will identify all actors participating in the transfer. The laws or
practices of the importing country will be considered incompatible
with the transfer tool if they: (1) “[do] not respect the essence of the
fundamental rights and freedoms of the European Union Charter of
Fundamental Rights, or” (2) “[e]xceed what is necessary and
proportionate in a democratic society to safeguard one of the
important objectives as also recognised in Union or member state law
such as those listed in Article 23(1) GDPR.”222 In short, if the importer
restricts the data subjects from enabling their rights, i.e. access
corrections and deletion requests for transferred data, judicial redress,
then the transfer tool is effectively applied. The Recommendation
specifically explains the FISA 702 situation:
“If your assessment of the relevant U. S. legislation leads you
to consider that your transfer might fall within the scope of Section 702
FISA, but you are unsure if it falls within its practical scope of
application, you may decide either:
1.
To stop the transfer;
2.
To
adopt
appropriate
supplementary
measures that ensure effectively a level of protection of
the data transferred essentially equivalent to that
guaranteed in the EEA; or
3.
To look at other objective, reliable, relevant,
verifiable and preferably publicly available
information (which may include information provided
to you by your data importer) to clarify the scope of
application in practice of Section 702 FISA to your
particular transfer.”223The Recommendation allows
the importer the ability to persuade their exporter that
FISA 702 does not apply to their particular transfer.
Importers should provide persuasive documentation
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to the exporter that shows FISA 702’s inapplicability.224
An importer may find that conducting a System and
Organization Control (SOC) 2 privacy audit may be
helpful in persuading the exporter of GDPR
compliance.225 If the exporter finds that FISA 702 does
not apply, then no supplementary measures are
necessary. If the exporter finds that FISA 702 does
apply, then supplementary measures must be taken, or
the data may not be transferred.
Step Four discusses the available supplementary measures.
Supplementary measures must be implemented on a case-by-case
basis unless the repeat transfers are of the same specific type to the
same third country.226 Supplementary measures may have a
contractual, technical or organizational nature. The Recommendation
finds that, generally, contractual and organizational measures alone
will not overcome problems arising from import countries’ legislation
and practices.227 Contractual and organizational measures can,
however, strengthen technical measures to rise to the level of
protection required. Annex 2 of the Recommendation lists examples of
the types of supplementary measures and circumstances in which they
may apply.228
Step Five advises on the procedure necessary for
supplementary measures in addition to different contractual transfer
tools, i.e., SCCs, BCRs, and ad hoc contractual clauses. For example,
224
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SCCs require that the supplementary measures not contradict the
SCCs and ensure the “protection guaranteed by the GDPR is not
undermined.”229 If the supplementary measure and SCC contradict
each other, then authorization from the competent supervisory
authority in accordance with Article 46(3)(a) of the GDPR is required.
Step Six is simply the requirement to re-evaluate transfer
compliance on an ongoing basis.230 Importers must watch their
country’s legislative developments to act accordingly to maintain
compliance. Currently, the best means of limiting liability and
maintain compliance with international privacy regulations would be
following advice set forth in the Recommendation.
C.

New Transatlantic Privacy Framework

On March 25, 2022, the White House issued a statement
announcing that the United States and European Union have
“committed to a new Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework, which
addresses the concerns raised by the [Schrems II decisions].”231 In its
press release, the White House confirms that new policies will be
implemented by the federal government to ensure that the United
States adheres to a reliable legal basis for continued data flows with
the European Union. Further, the press release confirms that
companies and organizations may continue to utilize the Privacy
Shield Principles to maintain compliance with the GDPR. It is the
United States’ position that President Biden’s Executive Order will
form the basis of the United States’ legal adequacy for GDPR
compliance.232 This Executive Order could have substantial effects on
data transfers and the requirements for how businesses maintain their
data.
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CONCLUSION

Even with the united promise of the new Trans-Atlantic Data
Privacy Framework, the future of the transatlantic trade relationship
remains unclear. The Schrems II decision puts the pressure on Congress
to enact privacy legislation that will further negotiations towards a
privacy agreement. Some unique characteristics may allow the current
Congress to enact this legislation.233 However, until they do, United
States organizations may use the guidance set out in this Note as a
means to limit their liabilities and to continue their trade with the EU.
This Note urges United States businesses to create a data inventory,
not only to comply with the inevitable future of privacy protection, but
also to increase their business’ profitability and efficiency. Further,
United States businesses should implement a privacy-conscious
approach to their data handling, due to the inevitability of increased
regulations on data handling. United States lawmakers and businesses
must adjust with the changing technologies, as they have the
obligation to protect their citizens’ and customers’ right to privacy.
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